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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a new general framework of information hid-
ing, in which the hidden information is embedded into a collection
of activities conducted by selected human and computer entities
(e.g., a number of online accounts of one or more online social net-
works) in a selected digital world. Different from other traditional
schemes, where the hidden information is embedded into one or
more selected or generated cover objects, in the new framework
the hidden information is embedded in the fact that some particular
digital activities with some particular attributes took place in some
particular ways in the receiver-observable digital world.
In the new framework the concept of “cover” almost disappears,
or one can say that now the whole digital world selected becomes
the cover. The new framework can find applications in both secu-
rity (e.g., steganography) and non-security domains (e.g., gaming).
For security applications we expect that the new framework calls
for completely new steganalysis techniques, which are likely more
complicated, less effective and less efficient than existing ones due
to the need to monitor and analyze the whole digital world con-
stantly and in real time. A proof-of-concept system was developed
as a mobile app based on Twitter activities to demonstrate the infor-
mation hiding framework works. We are developing a more hybrid
system involving several online social networks.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Traditional information hiding schemes embed hidden data into a
cover object (e.g., a file or a communication channel) by slightly
modifying its content, and hope to minimize the distortion be-
tween the original cover object and its information-bearing version
[6, 9, 11, 22, 23, 37, 42]. When an information hiding method is
used for security purposes, it is commonly called steganography
where the threat model is that the communications between the
sender and the receiver are under control of untrusted third-parties
like hostile authorities. Modifications made to the cover object(s)
provide possibilities for steganalysis [2, 10, 19, 35, 40]. Therefore,
it is necessary to invent new steganographic methods to make
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information hiding more secure. One new approach called gen-
erative (also known as coverless) information hiding is to move
away from using a selected (pre-existing) cover object, but to embed
hidden data into one or more generated objects that did not exist
[7, 26, 27, 34, 36, 38, 41, 44].
In this paper, we propose a new general information hiding
framework that goes beyond the generative/coverless approach. It
hides information in activities conducted by human and computer
entities in a selected digital world. Examples of digital worlds in-
clude the whole Internet, the whole Web, one or more online social
networks and/or web forums, an online game participated by many
(human and computer) players, a Wiki website with many editors
and visitors, an FTP server used by many users, a mailing list sub-
scribed by many subscribers, or even just a shared computer used
by multiple users. In this new framework, the concept of “cover”
becomes even less relevant, as the whole digital world selected
can be seen as the dynamic “cover” of all past and future hidden
messages embedded. In the new framework the hidden information
is represented by (i.e., embedded in) the fact that some particular
digital activities with some particular attributes took place in some
particular ways in the receiver-observable digital world. Here, the
information may be hidden in one or more ways, e.g., meta data of
some activities, a particular order and combination of some activi-
ties, selection of specific (types of) activities, and attributes of some
activities’ contents. The capacity of the new information hiding
framework is relatively low if activities’ contents are not used for
hiding information, but it can easily incorporate (i.e., conditionally
trigger) one or more traditional cover-based and coverless infor-
mation hiding methods (e.g., image and video based methods) to
increase the embedding capacity. The incorporation can take place
when and only when necessary to minimize the exposure of the
high-capacity (often less secure) scheme(s) to the adversary.
For security applications, a higher undetectability can potentially
be achieved using this new framework because that one can choose
not to change any content of the digital activities. This is possible
because the hidden information is now represented by some par-
ticular attributes of all the activities in the selected digital world
collectively. For non-security applications, the new framework can
open up many new possibilities for embedding information in dif-
ferent kinds of digital worlds, e.g., hidden plots, maps, weapons,
characters, and difficulty levels in an online game to increase the
level of player engagement and entertainment.
Although there is quite some related work, to the best of our
knowledge no any existing scheme or framework covers all the
features of the proposed framework. Some ad hoc schemes pro-
posed in the research literature can be considered special cases of
the proposed framework, but they are not presented as a general
framework that can be generalized to cover different types of digital
activities. In Section 2 we will give a more detailed review of all
related work we are aware of and how the proposed framework
differs from them.
The main focus of this paper is to present the general framework
as a new concept for designing information hiding schemes. Its fea-
sibility is demonstrated via a proof-of-concept system, a mobile app
allowing transmission of hidden messages between two persons
using Twitter as the digital world. The capacity allows short mes-
sages exchanged between two persons in a rate comparable to SMS
messages over mobile phones. The mobile app is designed more for
fun (non-security purposes), but it can be extended towards a more
secure system. We are currently implementing a larger proof-of-
concept system involving more than one online social networks
and multiple types of activities, for security applications.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.We introduce related
work in Section 2. Section 3 describes the architecture and general
steps of the proposed framework. Then, three core algorithms in
the proposed framework are introduced in Section 4. After the
core algorithms are explained, Section 5 describes the proof-of-
concept system we implemented to demonstrate the feasibility of
the proposed framework. Section 6 lists some possible extensions
to the basic framework. The last section concludes the paper.
2 RELATEDWORK
The idea of hiding information in activities has been used in other
contexts such as games (e.g., the bidding system in contract bridge
card games) and intelligence (e.g., secret agents reportedly used
physical activities to encode simple secret messages). There have
been some attempts of using activities in games to create covert
channels, but such work is all very ad hoc and cannot be directly
generalized to other digital activities. There has been some related
work on information hiding with online social networks, which
can be seen as special cases of the proposed framework. Some work
in network steganography may be considered loosely related as
well because most methods used meta data to hide information,
which may be argued as special digital activities. In this section, we
systematically categorize selected work on all types of information
hiding methods that are related to the proposed new framework
and explain how the new framework differs from them.
2.1 Selected Cover(s)
Covers used in information hiding are normally not fixed, so the
sender can freely decide what cover(s) to use for hiding a specific
message. There has been quite some work on how to better select
covers for increasing security and/or capacity. For instance, in [17],
images with larger changeable DCT coefficients and higher quality
factor are regarded as suitable images for secret data carrying.
For uncompressed image, suitable images are selected according
to image texture and complexity [31][32]. The images with more
complex texture are preferentially selected. A unified measure to
evaluate the hiding ability of a cover image is proposed in [39]
by representing images using the Gaussian mixture model and
formulated the measure in terms of the Fisher information matrix.
Our proposed new framework may involve selection of activities
that can be better used for information hiding purposes, but the
contents of those selected activities are not normally used as the
cover for hiding information.
2.2 Batch Steganography
Batch steganography aims to hide information securely by spread-
ing across a batch of covers, and the dual problem is called pooled
steganalysis – to obtain more reliable detection of steganography
in large sets of objects [13]. With batch steganography, the security
performance is improved with the increasing of the quantity of cov-
ers [14]. In [16], five payload-allocation strategies were proposed
for different scenes. In these strategies, the sender must know the
maximum length of secret data that he can embed into each given
image with the chosen steganographic method. So, the strategies
can only use for early non-adaptive steganographic methods. A
payload-allocation strategy for modern steganography was pro-
posed in [45]. The payload to be allotted for each image is calculated
by equating the steganographic distortion of all the images.
Our proposed new framework has some flavor of batch steganog-
raphy since normally multiple activities are involved for embedding
the hidden information. We however go beyond batch steganog-
raphy as relationships between selected activities and how they
appear in the whole digital world can also be used to embed infor-
mation. In addition, batch steganography still uses the content of
each cover for information hiding, which is normally not the case
for our framework.
2.3 Generative (Coverless) Information Hiding
The idea of generative information hiding probably appeared firstly
in 2007 [26, 27], when Otori and Kuriyama proposed to embed in-
formation by synthesizing texture images with different repetitive
texture patterns. Otori and Kuriyama’s scheme was improved by
Wu and Wang in [38], but the new scheme was shown insecure by
Zhou et al. [46]. In [41] a different scheme of generating marbling
textures to deliver hidden information. More recently, machine
learning based approaches have been considered to generate covers
for steganography [7, 34, 36]. In [44], Zhang et al. proposed a cov-
erless steganography method based on Discrete Cosine Transform
(DCT) and Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) topic classification,
where images that each represent a segment of the hidden message
are selected from a database.
Our proposed new framework may involve generated activities
for hiding information, but it can also work with modified meta
data or even content of selected activities so it supports hybrid
hiding methods.
2.4 Network Steganography
Network steganography techniques use network traffic as a carrier
for the secret data [23]. The various characteristic features such as
control information, behavior, or relationships of network protocols
can be utilized to conceal data in network traffic. These techniques
can be classified into storage and timing methods based on how the
secret data are encoded into the carrier. A real-time inter-protocol
steganographic method was proposed in [21]. It utilizes relation-
ships between two or more overt protocols to hide data, such as
the relationship between Real-Time Transport Protocol and Real-
time Control Protocol. Meanwhile, a data hiding detection method
which relies on network traffic coloring is introduced. In [12], the
least significant bits algorithm and an algorithm based on delayed
packets in VoIP streams are combined to forms a new algorithm.
The probability of detection existing steganography data is reduced
extensively using the combined algorithm.
The proposed new framework could involve activities taking
place at the network protocol level, but in most cases it will work
at the application and/or user level(s), i.e., it will mostly work with
activities at the highest layer of the network stack. Some ideas
used in network-based steganography can be used in the proposed
framework, e.g., the timing information of some specific posts from
some target accounts can be used to encode information in a way
similar to how timing information is used at the lower network
protocol layer.
2.5 Game-based Information Hiding
This approach conceals information in games, typically by hiding
information in game elements such as the chess board or sequence
of items generated [20, 25, 28] or how game players behave during
the game [4, 8, 24, 30]. Such information hiding methods has its root
in some popular games with multiple players who group into teams,
contract bridge being a well-known example in which players in
the same team use various activities based approaches to exchange
secret messages between them during the biding phase [1].
Some game-based information hiding schemes can be seen as
special cases of the proposed new framework, where the game is
the selected digital word and the information-bearing activities are
game players’ behaviors during one or more game sessions. None
of the game-based information hiding schemes have been designed
to allow further generalization to other digital worlds and activities.
2.6 Social Network Based Information Hiding
A phenomenon called social steganography was described in [18],
where hidden messages can be exchanged in social network. For
example, regular intervals posted messages on Facebook that on
the surface seemed innocent updates, but a hidden message can be
included. In [29], a steganographic system based on the online social
network platform Twitter was proposed, where the secret messages
are embedded into the length of tweets. In [5], an algorithm was
proposed to cloak messages by transforming them to resemble the
average Internet messages. A steganographic method converting
the secret message into “love” marks in WeChat (a popular instant
messaging system in China) is proposed in [43]. The sender can let
the “love” marking rate on each friend be a normal given value to
keep the covert communication confidential, and the receiver can
extract the secret message from only the visible “love” marks.
Most social network based information hiding schemes can be
seen as special cases of the proposed new framework, but what has
been reported in the literature is mostly ad hoc methods. Work in
this category does not go beyond online social networks like the
proposed framework does.
2.7 Other Behavioral Based Information
Hiding
Behavior based information hiding can be traced back to the pre-
WW2 and cold war ages when security agents often used specific
activities or behavior to deliver secret messages [3]. For instance,
one method for covert communication was how shoelaces were
tied: connecting them between the holes on both sides of a shoe
in different ways signaled certain things such as “follow me” or “I
have brought another person”.
The proposed framework may be understood as extending some
ideas security agents used in the physical world to the cyber world.
This move allows a high level or full automation of the information
encoding and decoding processes, and opens up the possibilities of
using a lot of new types of activities and digital worlds.
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Figure 1: Overall architecture of the proposed information hiding framework.
3 OVERALL ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we explain the basic ideas behind the proposed
framework, a high-level abstraction of the encoding and decod-
ing processes, potential applications, and how the activities in the
framework can be implemented in real world.
3.1 Basic Ideas
The proposed framework represents the secret message as activ-
ities in a selected digital world. Here, the digital world can be
anything where the sender and the receiver can communicate, e.g.,
a computer network such as the Internet and theWeb, or just a com-
puter with multi-user support. The secret message is not normally
embedded in the contents of activities as in traditional methods,
but represented as the fact some particular digital activities with
some particular attributes took place in some particular ways in
the receiver-observable digital world. The “cover” in the traditional
sense can be seen as the whole digital world. Since the contents of
information-bearing activities are not modified during the embed-
ding process, it has the potential to become more difficult to detect
for increased security. The overall architecture of the proposed
framework is shown in Figure 1.
The proposed framework partly addresses Open Problem 11 de-
scribed by Ker et al. in 2013 [15]: “Technical and societal aspects of
inducing randomness in communications to simplify steganogra-
phy.” In the context of this open problem, Ker et al. discussed how
“to engineer the real world so that parts of it match the assumptions
needed for security proofs.” To some extent, the proposed frame-
work gives a practical approach to engineering the real world by
embedding hidden information in the set of real-world activities.
The proposed framework also touches three other open problems
described in [15]: i) Open Problem 7 “Theoretical approaches and
practical implementations for embedding in multiple objects in
the presence of realtime constraints.” ii) Open Problem 9 “How to
perform cover selection, if at all? How to detect cover selection?”
iii) Open Problem 19 “Any detector for multiple objects, or based
on sequential hypothesis tests.” Note that Ker et al.’s paper focuses
on steganography (security applications) only, but the proposed
framework covers both security and non-security applications.
3.2 General Encoding and Decoding Processes
The encoding process can be largely split into three steps:
• Step 1: Converting the messageM into a bit sequence {bi }.
• Step 2: Converting {bi } into a number of activities {Ai }.
• Step 3: Using one or more entities to conduct {Ai }.
Once a hidden message is sent to the digital world, the receiver
can run the following process to detect and decode the message:
• Step 1: Scanning all relevant activities of the target entities’
{A} to find out if some activities represent a hidden message.
• Step 2: Once a subset of information-bearing activities {Ai }
are located, converting the activities into a bit sequence {bi }.
• Step 3: Converting {bi } to a messageM ′ which is readable
to the intended receiver (depending on if the message is for
a human receiver to read or a computer program to do some
automated work).
• Step 4: Checking the decoded message’s integrity and go
back to Step 1 if the message does not pass the integrity
check. This step may be done as part of Step(s) 2 and/or 3.
The whole processes of sending and receiving a hidden message
can be controlled by a secret “key” and/or a number of public
parameters which can influence different steps of the processes.
3.3 Applications and Implementations
Asmost other information hidingmethods, the proposed framework
can be used in not only security applications but also non-security
applications. In security applications, there will be a secret key
that may be used to determine some or all of the parameters. In
non-security applications, a key is normally not needed so the
whole process is essentially public. For security applications, we
also assume the sender and the receiver both possess a trusted
device that runs a trusted computer program implementing the
proposed information hiding framework.
Typical implementations of digital activities are those done by
online accounts registered with websites and Internet services.
However, many other online activities that may happen over the
Internet or any other types of computer networks can also be used
as long as i) the entities involved can be controlled by the sender
to conduct the activities and ii) the receiver can read the activities
and link them with the entities. To simplify our discussion in the
remaining parts of this paper, we will focus on online activities
conducted by Internet/web user accounts.
4 CORE ALGORITHMS
There are three core algorithms in the proposed framework: encod-
ing algorithm, decoding algorithm, and an algorithm for avoiding
conflicts of simultaneous access of the hidden communication chan-
nel by multiple senders (which is necessary for the core algorithms
to be robust and efficient in real world).
For security applications, the security of the core algorithms
depends on the “naturalness” of the online activities used to carry
a hidden message, where “naturalness” is defined as to what ex-
tent the information-carrying activities are indistinguishable from
other hidden information free activities. Note that the information-
carrying activities may not be only those generated by human users,
so the “naturalness” is not only about natural human behavior. Since
we are proposing a general framework, we leave security analysis
of different implementations of the framework as future work. In-
stead, our focus here is on the design of the core algorithms and the
development of a proof-of-concept system of the basic framework.
To ease the descriptions of the core algorithms, we make a num-
ber of assumptions and define some notations. We assume that the
hidden message to be sent has been converted to a bit sequence
M . The encoding and decoding algorithms are based on n “bits to
activities” mappings denoted by B2A1(·), ..., B2An (·). Each B2Ai (·)
can map B(i) bits into A(i) digital activities conducted by one or
more entities. A key K may be used to control all the “bit to ac-
tivities” mappings and other steps of the core algorithms when
the algorithms are applied to security applications. Note that the
“bit to activities” mappings can also be selected from a large set of
candidate mappings under the control of the key K .
4.1 Encoding Algorithm
The encoding algorithm is a two-step process as follows.
• Step 1 (optional): ExpandM by adding s ≥ 1 markersm(1),
... ,m(s). Denote the expanded message byM∗. The markers
may be added to any positions of M , and the positions are
derived from either K or a number of public parameters.
Some situations need to add markers are as follows:
– Some markers may be dependent onM , e.g., a hash value
ofM for integrity checking purposes.
– Some markers can be used to ease localization of the hid-
den message in digital activities at the decoder side. It
is optional because there are other ways to localize the
hidden message without using a marker (e.g., measuring
naturalness of decoded candidate messages).
– One marker may be added to the beginning ofM (“start
marker”), signaling the start of a message for streamlining
the decoding process.
– One marker may be appended to the end of M (“end
marker”), signaling the end of a message for error control
purposes and for streamlining the decoding process.
• Step 2: Convert the expanded messageM∗ into a number of
digital activities A(M∗). The process is better represented by
the following pseudo code in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Bits to Activities Mapping
A(M∗) = ∅
repeat
for i = 1 to n do
if there are less than B(i) bit inM∗ to be encoded then
padM∗ by a pre-defined bit pattern to have B(i) bits for
further encoding, where the padding bit sequence can be
static or dynamically generated
end if
M∗i = the next B(i) bit ofM∗
A(M∗) += B2Ai (M∗i )
M∗ −= M∗i
if M∗ = ∅ then
break
end if
end for
untilM∗ = ∅
Each activity in A(M∗) also contains needed (absolute and /or
relative) timing information about when the activity should be
conducted by the corresponding information-carrying account.
Any “bits to activities” mapping B2Ai (·) can be used in the above
encoding algorithm as long as they are invertible, meaning there is
an inverse mapping A2Bi (·) which fulfills A2Bi (B2Ai (x)) = x for
any given bit sequence x of size B(i). A mapping may involve one or
more entities (accounts) and one or more sites/services. The main
requirements of a “good” mapping include at least the following:
• Functionality: The mapping should do the work as expected
to convert a bit sequence to a finite number of digital activi-
ties that can be reversed back to the original bit sequence.
• Capacity: The mapping is expected to produce a reasonable
information hiding capacity. Note that the capacity is mea-
sure as the number of hidden bits transmitted per second.
• Security (for security applications only): The mapping should
not introduce unusual patterns in the generated activities in
the selected digital world so that detection of the presence
of hidden messages is possible.
• Usability: In case the mapping requires involvement of hu-
man users (e.g., to solve a CAPTCHA for posting a message),
it should be easy and not time consuming to conduct any
required manual operations.
• Robustness: The mapping should be robust to unintended
errors in the generated digital activities (which can either be
caused by the service providers or network failures). This
is the least important feature and may not be considered in
error-free environments.
When the selected digital world is the Internet, some example
mappings are the following:
• Posting messages and/or status updates on a website (e.g.,
a social networking website or a web forum) or an Internet
service (e.g., an instant messaging service).
• Replying, quoting, commenting, re-posting a message and/or
status update on a website or an Internet service.
• Private messages sent on a web forum to one or more user
accounts. In this case the receiver of the hidden message
needs to have access to one of the receiving user accounts.
• Following or un-following another user account.
• The fact of uploading a particular file to a particular website
at a particular time.
• Visiting a website or an FTP server using a particular man-
ner (e.g. browsing different web pages of a website to form
a particular order and browsing each page for a particular
amount of time). In this case the receiver of the hidden mes-
sage needs to have access to the visit log of the website or
the FTP server, i.e., he/she is an administrator.
In the next section, we will give more details about twomappings
implemented in the proof-of-concept system.
4.2 Decoding Algorithm
The decoding algorithm can be roughly split into four steps:
• Step 1 (only when start markers are used in the encoding
process): From a given time t0 scanning for the first start
marker. The starting time of the scanning process can be
defined by the user or automatically set as the last time when
a hidden message was successfully decoded.
• Step 2: Locating the start of the expanded messageM∗ and
decoding it.
• Step 3 (only whenmarkers are used in the encoding process):
Verifying all markers (which may include a padding pattern
at the end) in the decoded message and remove them from
M∗ to get the original hidden messageM .
• Step 4 (optional): Checking “natural” (e.g., linguistic and
statistic) characteristics to see if the decoded message is a
real hidden message. This step can be done manually by the
receiver, but when there are too many false positives (e.g., no
error control markers are added and the error rate is high) it
will be important to let the decoder (a computer program) to
automatically detect some (if not all) false positive messages.
The actual decoding process is more involved because Step 1
depends on a partial decoding process so it is mixed with Step 2.
In addition, in case no any markers are inserted, Step 4 is better
incorporated into Step 2 to make a more effective use of memory,
otherwise one needs to decode a long message and then look for
possible hidden message(s). From the above issues, we represent
the whole decoding process using the pseudo code in Algorithm 2.
While the above algorithm defines a quite clear process, the main
purpose of the pseudo code is to show what the decoder is sup-
posed to do rather than how the algorithm should be implemented.
Alternative ways of implementing the same algorithm is possible
and encouraged for optimizing the use of memory and time. The
naturalness checking step in the above algorithm is not defined so
it is a sub-algorithm that can be studied separately. When synchro-
nization markers are used, however, the naturalness checking is
usually not needed. Even when synchronization markers are not
Algorithm 2 Decoding Algorithm
if the system is configured to have a start marker at the beginning
ofM∗ in the encoding process then
repeat
search for the first start marker in A from t0
until a start marker is detected
set t0 to be the time immediately after the first start mark
appears
end if
A = all activities of all information-carrying accounts from a
given time t0 to the current time
M = "" (empty string)
stop flag = false;
repeat
for i = 1 to n do
if there are less than A(i) activities in A then
stop flag = true
break
end if
Ai = the sequence of the next A(i) activities that have not
been processed
M += A2Bi (Ai )
A −= Ai
if the system is configured to have an end marker at the
end ofM∗ in the encoding process then
if the newly added part ofM contains an end mark then
remove the end marker and any bits after it fromM
stop flag = true
break
end if
end if
end for
until A = ∅ or the stop flag is true
if the decoder is configured to check “naturalness” of M in real
time then
if M does not pass the naturalness check then
return NULL
end if
end if
return M
used, it is still possible to depend on human users to decode hidden
messages as long as the decoded message is not too long. Therefore,
we do not consider the naturalness checking sub-algorithm as a
very important component for the basic framework.
4.3 Conflict Avoidance Algorithm
The above encoding algorithm will take time to encode a hidden
message. Communicating the activities to the network using the
information-carrying accounts will normally take an even longer
time since all the activities need posting to the network reliably.
Depending on the “bits to activities” mappings, the timing order of
activities may not matter. It is also possible to use multiple threads
to conduct those activities simultaneously if there are multiple
network interfaces. However, in most practical cases, we need a
way to serialize all the activities so that they are posted to the
network in a deterministic order since the decoding process looks
at activities sequentially.
Since encoding and sending a hiddenmessage take time, conflicts
may occur if multiple senders sharing the same hidden communica-
tion channel want to send hidden messages at the same time (or at
different times but the duration of the encoding/sending processes
overlap). This may happen when the two parties of a communi-
cation channel wants to send hidden message simultaneously or
when there are multiple senders who want to send hidden messages
to the same receiver using the same channel. Both cases can be
avoided by allocating different communication channels (i.e., differ-
ent sets of information-carrying accounts) to 1) different directions
of communications between two parties; 2) any different pairs of
communicating parties. Such a simplistic solution suffers from the
insufficient use of system resources and inconvenience users as
more keys need to be managed by each user.
The problem can be solved by a send-and-check process at the
encoder side. Such a process can be designed following similar
protocols in other areas, e.g., telecommunications and operating
systems.
5 PROOF-OF-CONCEPT SYSTEM
This section describes a proof-of-concept system of the proposed
information hiding framework as a demonstrator and a preliminary
evaluation of its usability through a lab-based user study.
5.1 Design and Implementation
In the proof-of-concept system, the online social network plat-
form Twitter is selected as the digital world and selected Twitter
accounts under control of the sender are used as the information-
carrying accounts. Two “bits to activities” mappings were designed.
One mapping is based on the retweeting functionality: given 2d
information-carrying accounts each is associated with 2e target
retweeting accounts, the mapping converts a (d + e)-bit sequence
into a unique pair of (information-carrying account, retweeted ac-
count). The other mapping is simpler and only encodes one bit: it
selects one of two ways to retweet the selected retweeted account’s
tweet (the two ways are: direct retweeting and tweeting by sim-
ply quoting the retweeted account’s tweet). Note that the second
mapping does not generate any separate activity but modifies the
activities generated by the first mapping, which is a way how two
mappings can be combined to form a more complicated mapping.
In total the two mappings give a capacity of (d + e + 1) per activity.
The actual values of d and e in this proof-of-concept system are
d = 5 and e = 8. The embedding capacity depends on the number
of activities posted on Twitter, but our experiments showed it can
reach the level of sending a typical short message in just one or
two minutes, so comparable with SMS messages on mobile phones
(which can have a delay up to a few minutes).
For the proof-of-concept system we decided to include two mark-
ers: one start marker and one endmarker of size 14 bits (dynamically
generated from a key) to signal the start and the end of the hidden
message, respectively. The hidden message is encrypted by AES
(128-bit key, PKCS5 padding, ECB mode to minimize error prop-
agation) before being encoded. The end of the hidden message is
Figure 2: Snapshot of the demonstrated mobile app - camou-
flage functionality.
padded using a random bit sequence generated by the key. Twit-
ter API is used to automate the process of posting retweets and
checking the status of control accounts.
The proof-of-concept system is implemented as a mobile app
running from an Android device. The “camouflage” functionality
of the mobile app is a simple calculator and the magic gesture for
activating the information hiding functionality is “pressing the <C>
button for seven times”. This magic gesture is purely indicative
and more complicated ones could be easily implemented. Figure 2
shows a snapshot of the camouflage interface of the mobile app.
After the magic gesture is given, the mobile app will show an
interface with three buttons “Encode”, “Decode” and “Settings”. The
first two buttons allow sending and receiving hidden messages and
the last one allows viewing control accounts used and checking
their online status.
Click the “Encode” button, one can enter a key and a hidden
message and then click the “Encode” button to send the hidden
message to Twitter. Figure 3 shows two snapshots of the encoding
process of an example hiddenmessage. The actual speed of encoding
a message of 16 bytes is roughly 1 minute.
Click the “Decode” button, one can enter a key and then click
the “Scan” button to retrieve any possible hidden messages sent
previously using the same mobile app and the same key. Figure 4
shows two snapshots of the scanning (decoding) process of an
example hidden message.
The mobile app can be downloaded from http://www.hooklee.
com/Papers/Data/MPS2018/MobileMagicMirror.zip. To test it two
persons need to both install the app and agree on a key. The mobile
app is not equipped with a conflict avoidance algorithm and by
default uses some fixed Twitter accounts (created for the proof-of-
concept system), so if more than two persons are using it at the
same time, the communications may not be successful. We may
develop an updated version of the mobile app with a basic conflict
avoidance algorithm in future.
Figure 3: Snapshot of the demonstrated mobile app - encod-
ing a hidden message.
Figure 4: Snapshot of the demonstrated mobile app - scan-
ning for (decoding) a hidden message.
5.2 Security
As a first proof-of-concept system, the mobile app is designed to
showwider (security and non-security) applications of the proposed
information hiding framework, so making a highly secure system is
not our main focus. As a matter of fact, the activities of information-
carrying accounts used in the proof-of-concept system contain only
retweets of a fixed 2e target accounts. Such an obvious behavioral
pattern can be easily detected by both humans and machines. In
2017 we conducted an experiment with human participants on
detecting such accounts [33], and it did show that most human
participants had noticed the unusual retweeting-only behavior.
While detecting an information-carrying account used in the proof-
of-concept system may be relatively easy, the distribution of the
hidden information across 2d accounts means that the probability
for an adversary to correctly detect all the information-carrying
accounts and recovering the right order for conducting an analysis
of the whole hidden message will be low as long as d is reasonably
large. Detecting any single account among all accounts in Twitter
is also a hard task if the adversary has no previously known target
accounts to focus its investigation on.
At the system level, there is also a demand of hiding the informa-
tion hiding functionality itself. This is important when an untrusted
person or organization (e.g., a hostile governmental body) gains
access to the trusted device. When the hostile governmental body
is involved, the issue has to be considered in the context of digital
forensics where more advanced software and hardware tools can be
used to scan the whole device. This new demand requires no long-
term sensitive data being stored in volatile or non-volatile memory
of the trusted devices. Instead, such information should be kept for
a minimum time, e.g., for displaying a decoded short message on the
screen for just 10-20 seconds. In addition, this challenge requires
information hiding at the system level, i.e., hiding the information
hiding functionality itself. This means that the information hiding
functionality should be hidden from the visible user interface and
is triggered only by some secret activation signal.
As to the ability in resisting existing steganalytic methods, the
proposed framework has the potential to work well due to the
disappearance of the “cover”. Most modern steganalytic tools use
supervised machine learning to detect signs of steganography by
investigating the models of covers and stego-objects. Features are
extracted from a set of labeled objects to train a common stegana-
lytic model, and then used to distinguish a suspicious object. In the
proposed framework, the feature extraction operation cannot be
carried on easily since the stego objects are effectively the whole
digital space. In pooled steganalysis, it is assumed that the war-
den already possesses a quantitative detector for whatever type of
steganography the sender is using, an estimator for the length of
the hidden message in an individual stego object as a proportion
of the maximum length. This is an assumption hardly true for the
proposed framework.
To improve security, some extensions to the basic framework
can be considered, some of which are discussed in Section 6.
5.3 Usability Evaluation
Although our own testing of the mobile app showed that it was
very easy to use, we wanted to have a more proper evaluation of its
usability from normal users’ perspective. To this end, we conducted
a usability evaluation experiment. In the evaluation, in total 15
participants were recruited, including 11 males and 4 females with
different demographic backgrounds.
On a scale of 5 points, the user rated encoding and decoding
times. The median ratings for both times are 3, and the averages
are 2.87 and 3.20, respectively. It seems participants tended to have
more concerns on the relatively slow encoding time.
We also asked all participants what their maximum tolerances
for the encoding and decoding times were, and the answers vary a
lot (ranging from 1 second to 2 minutes for the encoder and from 1
second to 1.5 minutes for the decoder). The median tolerance for
the encoding time is 30 seconds and that for the decoding time is
halved. The average tolerances for the encoding and decoding times
are 30.50 and 27.67, respectively, but we consider these average
values are less informative due to the high variances of user ratings.
The most interesting results are those about the likelihood to
use the mobile app in real world. One participant gave the lowest
rating (1) and three participants gave the highest rating (5). The
median rating is 3 and the average is 3.47.
Looking at the results as a whole, we felt that the proof-of-
concept system is largely acceptable for exchanges of basic textual
messages. Note that the embedding capacity can be easily increased
by incorporating a high-capacity information hiding method into
the proposed framework (see Section 6.3 for more details).
6 POSSIBLE EXTENSIONS
What we described so far is just the general framework and a
relatively simplistic proof-of-concept system. The framework can
actually be enhanced by some extensions in order to improve its
functionalities and the overall performance. Some of such exten-
sions can contribute to a higher level of security by making the
information-carrying activities more “natural” and/or reducing the
exposure of less “natural” activities. In the following, we briefly
describe some selected extensions that we have considered.
6.1 Partial Embedding: Decoy Activities
The “bits to activities” mappings used in the encoding algorithm do
not have to use all activities generated to carry the hidden informa-
tion. Instead, a “bits to activities” mapping can also generate “decoy”
activities that to make detection of hidden information even harder.
Such decoy activities can be linked with those information-carrying
activities so that the activities of each information-carrying account
look more natural. For instance, if one information-carrying activ-
ity is about reposting a particular user’s tweet, then a decoy activity
can be generated to repost another related tweet of the same user.
We call the technique of not using the whole capacity of a covert
channel for information hiding purpose “partial embedding”, fol-
lowing a similar concept in traditional information hiding methods.
A partial embedding mapping can be designed by defining a
way to generate decoy activities and for decoding the hidden in-
formation the inverse mapping can simply ignore all such decoy
activities. One naive example is to simply generate a double number
of activities and use the odd-numbered activities for information
hiding purpose. A slightly more advanced approach is to generate
a pseudo-random bit sequence and then use it to decide which
activities are decoys.
The above partial embedding idea can be further enhanced by
involving the human user (the sender) to define the contents of
the generated decoy activities. This can help improve the security
of the information hiding framework. This can be done by two
approaches: 1) asking the human user to fill the contents in the
encoding process; 2) collecting contents of real activities conducted
by the human user in advance (before the encoding process starts)
and then automatically filling the generated decoy activities. The
first approach will require the human user’s active involvement in
the encoding process and can lower usability and prolong the whole
encoding process. The second approach is a more desired solution,
but requires active collection of the human user’s online activities
and a “smart” algorithm to decide what real online activities should
be used for what decoy activities.
6.2 Modulating Real Online Activities
Rather than using real online activities for decoy activities, it will
be even more secure if we use real online activities for information
hiding purpose as well. In other words, we may be able to modulate
real online activities in some way to convey additional hidden
information without touching the semantic contents of the real
online activities. This requires a queuing mechanism where human
users’ real online activities and hidden messages are all recorded
and scheduled for sending to the network so that the modulation
can take place at the earliest possible time. The scheduler must
consider how to balance the need to send the real online activities
and the hiddenmessages. For instance, if there is no hiddenmessage
the real online activities may be held only for a period of time rather
than be held forever. The system may need to allow human users
to label real online activities about by when they must be posted,
which will add further complexity to the scheduling algorithm.
While we have not investigated this extension in depth, we
already identified two potential modulation methods. The first
method considers the order of real online activities. Given a number
of real online activities originated from a single human user, it is
often possible to shuffle their order without causing any loss of
information the human user intends to convey. By asking the human
user to label dependent activities, the scheduler can know what
activities are independent of each other so their relative positions
in the sequence of finally posted online activities do not matter. The
order can be used as a side channel to carry hidden information.
Another modulation method considers timing information. Even
when there are dependencies among all real online activities in
the queue, it is often the case that when exactly those activities
go online does not really matter. This allows the possibility to use
timing as a side channel to carry hidden information. Since it is
normally impossible to control timing precisely, a mechanism is
needed to calibrate the timing accuracy (possibly in a dynamic
manner) and encode this information as part of the (expanded)
hidden message.
Essentially speaking, modulating real online activities for infor-
mation hiding is about using some non-content properties of real
online activities as cover of the hidden information, so in theory it is
still covered by the basic idea of the information hiding framework.
6.3 Combination with Traditional Information
Hiding Methods
It is possible to combine the proposed information hiding frame-
workwith one ormore traditional content-based information hiding
methods. The capacity of the proposed information hiding frame-
work is smaller than most traditional methods since the latter can
make use of a large amount of bits representing the contents of
some digital objects. However, using traditional methods for trans-
mitting short messages too frequently may invite suspicion (e.g.,
uploading images to a web forum too often may be seen as an
abnormal behavior if image-based steganography is used). Com-
bining the proposed information hiding framework and traditional
ones can help increase the capacity of the proposed framework and
reduce the unnecessary exposure of the use of traditional methods
thus leading to a higher level of security.
The combination can be done by using the proposed information
hiding framework as a command and control (C&C) channel to
signal the occasional use of one or more traditional content-based
information hidingmethods, the cover(s) and parameters used. Note
that the covers of the traditional content-based information hiding
methods do not have to be on the same web site or the Internet
service as the proposed information hiding framework, which can
help increase security.
6.4 Naturalness Checking Sub-Algorithm
While the naturalness checking sub-algorithm in the decoding
process is not absolutely necessary, it can help increase capacity
(by reducing the number of markers needed and their sizes) and
improve usability of the system (by reducing unnecessary human
involvement in the decoding process). The naturalness checking
process normally requires a sufficiently long message so that there
are enough linguistic or statistical evidence to make a decision.
One typical example is the information entropy of the message
decoded. A rubbish message normally looks random and tends
to have a high information entropy, while a real textual message
readable to human users tends to have a low information entropy.
To calculate the information entropy of a message, there should be
enough bytes to make a statistical difference. Some other statistical
indicators can be developed based on a similar idea. For instance,
for an English textual message we can look at the probability that
all bytes received are either English letters or some commonly used
punctuation markers to check its naturalness.
7 CONCLUSION
A new general framework for information hiding is proposed in this
paper. The secret message is represented as activities happening in
a selected digital world, conducted by one or more human and com-
puter entities. The new framework relates to a number of old and
new concepts in information hiding, but none of existing methods
or frameworks cover all features offered by the new framework. We
have developed a simple proof-of-concept system to demonstrate
the feasibility of the framework. We expect more diverse and com-
plicated implementations of the proposed framework can be done,
and we are in the process of producing one involving multiple web
services and with an enhanced level of security.
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